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COMES NOW the Appellant, Brandon Winkler, by and through his attorney David H.
Leroy, and submits this brief in support of the appeal filed herein:

I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Appellant was previously convicted of misdemeanor DUis in Idaho in 2001 and
2004. He was then convicted of a felony DUI by a Judgment entered April 26, 2006, some
thirteen years ago, and served I and ½ years in Department of Correction custody. (Record, pages
86-89, hereinafter (R, 86-89)) Brandon was released in August 2007 and remained law abiding
for over a decade. In fact, Brandon sought and obtained a "complete" and "unconditional"
Pardon from the Idaho Commission on Pardons and Paroles on April 6, 2017. (R, 43) In 2019,
Mr. Winkler was again arrested.
The Defendant-Appellant herein, Brandon Winkler, was aITaigned and appeared on the
Complaint filed by the Ada County Prosecutors Office which alleged that Mr. WinkJer
feloniously drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol on January 5th, 2019,
"while having pied guilty to or having been found guilty of a prior felony conviction of LC.
Section 18-8004 . .. . within the previous fifteen years." (R, 7-8) The Defendant filed a Motion
to Dismiss the felony Complaint on March 1 2019, citing the prior Pardon of the earlier
conviction as grounds for relief and attaching a copy. (R, 41-43) At the preliminary hearing
before Magistrate James Cawthon held April 2, 2019, the Defense again raised the issue of Mr.
Winkler' s prior Pardon to preserve the issue, but waived the hearing.
The Defense filed a Memorandum in Support of Dismissal (R, 44-50). The State
responded with two written Objections (R, 54-60 and R, 72-83). Argwnent was had before the
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 1

Honorable Lynn Norton, District Judge, on May 23, 2019. Being fully informed of the written
and oral arguments of both sides, Judge Norton ruled from the bench, on the record, denying the
Defendant's Motion to dismiss, but recommending to both parties that the novelty and
importance of the question made it appropriate for an interlocutory appeal. (See Transcript of
Hearing and Ruling, pages 20-27). After consultation with counsel, the Defendant on June 3rd,
2019 requested the District Court to issue an order recommending such an appeal. (R, 97-98).
The District Court entered the Order on June 10th (R, 105-109) and this Court granted permission
to appeal on an interlocutory basis on June 26th , 2019. (R, 114) As instructed, the DefendantAppeUant timely filed his Notice of Appeal, (R, 115-117) placing this question before the
Supreme Court.

IL
ISSUES ON APPEAL
(1) Can a previous DU1 conviction for which a Pardon has been obtained be counted as a

''prior" under the fifteen year sweep back penalty enhancement provisions of Idaho Code Section
18-8005(9)?
(2) Did the District Court below wrongly deny the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
enhancement-based felony complaint when presented with the evidence of the Pardon?
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Idaho Criminal Rule 48 permits the Court to dismiss a case. Rule 48 uses the permissive
term "may dismiss" rather than a mandatory"shall dismiss" and therefore dismissal is subject to
the trial court's discretion. State v. Dixon, 140 Idaho 301,304 (Ct. App. 2004). When a trial
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court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered
inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether
the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 ldaho 598,
600 (1989). If the District Court has not correctly interpreted the relevant Pardon and DUI
enhancement authorities and statutes, it has not exercised discretion consistent with the
applicable legal standards and this Court should reverse the ruling below.
lV.

ARGUMENTS
A.

INTRODUCTION
As far as Appellant's counsel can determine, this in an issue of first impression in ldaho.
The Commission on Pardons and Paroles exercises a constitutional authority on behalf of the
Executive Branch of state government pursuant to Article IV, Section 7 of the Idaho
Constitution:
"7. THE PARDONING POWER
Such board as may hereafter be created or provided by legislative
enactment shall constitute a board to be known as the board of pardons.
Said board, or a majority thereof, shall have power to remit fines and
forfeitures, and, only as provided by statute, to grant commutations and
pardons after conviction and judgment, either absolutely or upon such
conditions as they may impose in all cases of offenses against the state
except treason or conviction on impeachment. The legislature shall by
law prescribe the sessions of said board conviction on impeachment.
The legislature shall by law prescribe the sessions of said board and the
manner in which application shall be made, and regulated proceedings
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thereon, but no fine or forfeiture shall be remitted, and no commutation
or pardon granted, except by the decision of a majority of said board, after
a full hearing in open session, and until previous notice of the time and
place of such hearing and the release applied for shall have been given by
publication in some newspaper of general circulation at least, once a week
for four weeks. The proceedings and decision of the board shall be reduced
to writing and with their reasons for their action in each case, and the
dissent, of any member who may disagree, signed by him, and filed, with
all papers used upon the hearing, in the office of the secretary of state."
(emphasis added)
When originally adopted in 1890, this provision gave the pardon power and all functions related
thereto an original constitutional dimension, when exercised by the Board of Correction, superior
in authority to mere statute. However, a 1986 constitutional amendment of the language, as cited
above, has now reduced the exercise of said power to a status "only as provided by statute."
The Pardon Certificate received by Mr. Winkler notes, on its face, that he is pardoned for
the 2006 felony DUI and is restored to "all civil, political and other rights enjoyed prior to the
commission of the crime." (R, 43) Significantly, nothing in either the above cited constitutional
language, or in any legislative statute, defines nor specifically diminishes the potency or effect of
an Idaho pardon, as to subsequent offenses.
The Idaho Supreme Court, prior to the 1986 amendment of the Idaho Constitution, did
hold that the legislature may provide limitations and procedw-es controlling "parole", but
preserved unfettered the constitutional authority of the Board of Corrections to define the effect
of and implement both pardons and commutations.
" The Idaho Constitution provides that the Board, or a majority thereof
' shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures, and to grant commutations
and pardons after conviction and judgment.' On the other hand, the
legislature has the power to define crime and fix punishment subject to
the constraints discussed in (citations omitted). So the issue is whether
parole is a form of commutation and pardon or a part of punishment.
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This is a case of first impression for this Court. Certain cases' offered by
appellant contain language that could be interpreted as holding parole to
be synonymous with pardon and commutation. However, those cases
dealt either with the issue of whether the Board could extend a sentence
beyond that announced by the sentencing judge (it cannot) or with the
issue as to whether the Board may exercise discretion in refusing to grant
a timely request for parole (it can). That authority is not dispositive of the
issue now before the Court.
Our analysis of both the historic development and the present usage of
parole leads us to conclude that the limitations on parole established by
the legislature do not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
The Constitution speaks only of commutations and pardons. These differ
from paroles. A pardon does away with both the punishment and the effect
of a finding of guilt. A commutation diminishes the severity of a sentence,
e.g. shortens the term of punishment. A parole does neither of these things.
A parole merely allows the convicted party to serve part of his sentence
under conditions other than those of the penitentiary. The party is not
'pardoned' of his guilt, nor is a portion of his sentence ' commuted.' He
is still under the supervision of the authorities and subject to revocation of
his paroled should he violate the conditions thereof. Thus, we find that
parole is within the legislative scope of establishing suitable punis.hment
for the various crimes."
Standlee v. State 96 ldaho 849, 851-852, 538 P2d 778 (1975) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added)

B.

"A PARDON DOES AWA Y WITH BOTH THE PUNISHMENT AND THE EFFECT OF A

FINDING OF GUILT"
Nothing contained in the text of the 1986 constitutional an1endment or any subsequent
legislative act or Idaho state court case has diminished the Supreme Court' s emphatic and clear
holding in Standlee, captioned above.

It falls to this Court in this case to apply the Standlee rule to this Appellant, in a matter of
first impression.
Various tangential precedents are not controlling.
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The baseline case of Manners v. State Board of Veterinary Medicine, 107 Idaho 950, 694
P2d 1298 (1985) held that a prior conviction vacated by a district court became a "nonexistent
felony conviction" and could not be used as grounds for the subsequent administrative revocation
of a license.
On July 6, 1994, Idaho Attorney General's Office issued Opinion 94-3 which held, after the
adoption of the 1986 constitutional amendment discussed above, that the Idaho Commission on
Pardons and Paroles may exercise its twin power, commutation, during the fixed term of a prisoner,
in derogation of a court sentence and the statutes specifying that procedure. The opinion discusses
both the Uniform Sentencing Act provisions and the 1986 constitutional amendment which
purportedly, to some unspecified extent, was designed "to remove from constitutional status the
powers of commutation and pardon" and make them "subject to amendment by statute by the
Legislature." Statement of Purpose. Senate Joint Resolution No. 107. 1986 ldaho Legislature.
The opinion concludes that unless the Legislature has passed a statute designed to regulate
the previously unlimited power of the Commission to "commute" (and by analogy, "pardon") any
and all sentences, the authority to grant and the effect of receiving a commutation remains
undiminished.
"Because there are no legislative enactments that limit the power to commute, the
Commission may commute fixed term sentences in its discretion." Opinion, supra, page2
Likewise, Idaho Code 18-8005 (9) does not expressly or impliedly limit the pardon power
of the Commission.
The line of cases which holds that dismissed prior DUI' s shall be counted for enhancement
purposes because a finding of "guilt" was at one time entered is also inapposite here, as a pardon

APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 6

absolves the "guilt." See State v. Craig. 117 ldabo 983, 793 P2d 215 (1990) and State v. Deitz, 120
Idaho 775, 819 P 2d 1155 (1991).

"In determining whether the enhanced penalty provisions of Section 18-8005 apply in a given
case, the controlling event to be considered by the trial court is determination of guilt- the conviction
or plea." State v. Deitz, Id at 1156.
Thus, constitutional authority exercised by the Commission on Pardons and Paroles, and the
purpose and intended effect of a pardon when granted, are easily distinguished from a court' s
readjustment of its own judgments and judicial records. The executive pardon process is easily
distinguished from the far more common judicial dismissal of a withheldj udgment at the completion
of probation. The enhancement statute at issue here does not mention "pardons." Instead, it merely
warns that it will count, for subsequent purposes, prior guilty pleas or prior felony convictions under
Idaho DUI statutes "notwithstanding the form of the judgments or withheld judgments," Idaho Code
18-8005(9)
With the Pardon he obtained, Mr. Winkler has neither prior "guilt" nor a "prior j udgment"
upon which the proposed enhancement can be based.
C.
AN IDAHO FEDERAL PRECEDENT IS NOT INSTRUCTIVE
The Court should also review the Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Bays. 589 F 3d 1035
(2009)
Therein, the federal court on appeal held that an Idaho pardon did not constitute an
"expungement" under the United States District Court Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant Bays was
thus unsuccessful at arguing that his criminal history calculation was incorrect under the national
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government point system.
While the case purports to weigh the effect of an Idaho pardon, it did not do so correctly in
the context of either the Idaho Constitution or our DUI enhancement statutes. The Ninth Circuit
even mischaracterized Idaho Code provision 19-2604 as an "expungement'' law, deeming any relief
thereunder as stronger and more extensive than that obtained under a constitutional pardon. The
Defense herein respectfully disagrees with that conclusion and urges that the Bays precedent is not
useful guidance herein.

D.
JUDGE NORTON WRONGLY DECIDED TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS
In ruling from the bench against the Motion to Dismiss, The District Judge was primarily
guided by a Black's Law Dictionary entry which distinguished the definition of "pardon" from the
meaning of the word "amnesty." That text suggested, as the Judge read into the record:
"It defines it as "An act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted
with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed."
And then Black's Law Dictionary continues, "Pardon' is to be distinguished
from 'amnesty. ' The former applies only to the individual, releases him
from the punishment fixed by law for hls specific offense, but does not affect
the criminality of the same or similar acts when performed by other
persons or repeated by the same person. The latter term denotes an act of
grace, extended by the government to all persons who may come within its
terms, and whlch obliterates the criminality of past acts done, and declares
that they" will- "shall not be treated as punishable."
So Black's Law Dictionary distinguishes between pardon, which eradicates
the punishment but does not distinguish - it distinguishes that from amnesty,
which actually obliterates the offense as if it had never happened.
In reading the language of the pardon given by the Idaho Parole Comn1ission,
and it says the effect of the pardon is to restore all civil rights. I do not believe
that that pardon, as it is worded, given the meaning of the tenn "pardon," did
away with the ability to use that as an enhancement under the Idaho Supreme
Court's interpretation of Idaho's driving under the influence statute and
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its enhancement provisions. The Idaho Supreme Court views an enhancement
as different from the underlying conviction and it is the guilty plea that triggers
the enhancement, not actually the judgment of conviction."
(Transcript of Proceedings, page 25, line 19 to page 26, line 20) (citations omitted)

Yet, Judge Norton recognized that this was a very subjective and close call on such relatively
light precedent that she commended the issue to this Court for a definitive review saying:
"Recognizing that some may view the word pardon" to mean more along
the lines of what is defined - I've defined today as "amnesty," I think it
could have a significant impact. So if the parties want an interlocutory appeal
of this ruling, I would actually certify this issue to the Supreme Court
for an interlocutory appeal ... " (Transcript page 27, lines 8-14)

The Judge also examined two relevant Idaho cases and the text of the Pardon certificate itself.

In her comments on Standlee v. State, supra, she wrongly characterized, in the Appellant's opinion,
the holding that "A pardon does away with both the punishment and effect of a finding of guilt" as
mere "dicta" upon the rationale that the Standlee Court "dealt with a parole and a commutation."
(Transcript, page 21 , line 23 to page 22, line 3) The Appellant urges this Court that the ruling stated
is a worthy holding properly and well applied to a Pardon, and says exactly what the 1975 Idaho
Supreme Court intended to be and should be the law of Idaho.
Judge Norton was also led away from a correct ruling by her misapplication of State v.
Glenn, 156 Idaho 22, 319 P 3d 1191 (2014) which also interpreted ldabo Code Section 18-8005 (9),
as to the unsupported conclusion that a Idaho Code Section 19-2604 dismissal was comparable to
a pardon.
The Appellant concedes that the Glenn court focused upon the existence of an anytime
"finding of guilt" as adequate to trigger the enhancement. That Court also held that the form of the
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judgment was of no consequence. Conceding those points, a Pardon is not a mere judgment and its
very core purpose is to remove any and every disability that would flow as a consequence of that
prior crime's finding of gui It. Thus, Judge Norton correctly anticipated that the 2019 Idaho Supreme
Court, not the 2014 Glenn court, must either recognize and protect the constitutional and historic
Pardon effect or extend the prior ruling to an extent not yet covered by that earlier holding as to
judgments.

In the absence of a statutory definition of Pardon, she mused that the text of the Parole
Commission certificate which restored to Mr. Winkler "all civil, political and other rights" was not
the sufficient equivalent of an "amnesty" to protect him from a sweep back provision. The Appellant
disputes this. Measuring the application of a DUI statutory enhancement provision against the
Black's Law Dictionary definition of"amnesty" is not the best approach by which to illuminate the
range of future protections afforded to the recipient ofa constitutionally grow1ded, executive branch
issued Pardon. Neither do any implications of the Glenn case, nor wrongly downgrading to mere
"dicta" status the clear language of the Standlee holding, compel the conclusion that the Legislature
intended in 18-8005 (9), without saying so directly, that the protections of a Pardon should be
ignored. Per the text of the Pardon, Mr. Winkler had the "right" not to be enhanced for that earlier
felony of which he was cleansed. Per the text of Standlee, this coUit has held "A pardon does away
with the . . .. effect of a finding of guilt." With respect, Judge N 01ton ' s ruling should be reversed.
E.

OTHER STATES, ON VARIOUS RATION ALES, HAVE PREFERRED THE PARDON
POWER OVER NON-SPECIFIC ENHANCEMENT STATUTES
Collected at 97 A.LR. 5th 293, under the title "Pardoned or Expunged Conviction as "Prior
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Offense" Under State Statute or Regulation Enhancing Punishment for Subsequent Conviction," is
a useful annotation which suggests that the majority view among the several states reasons that a
pardon does not preclude a prior conviction from being considered as an enhancement offense under
many subsequent punishment schemes. We ask this Court to adopt the " significant minority"
position to the contrary, as it is better reasoned and accords the significance and comfort that a hard
to obtain, executive branch-issued pardon ought to retain in today' s society.
In Alabama, a pardon blots out the guilt, making the offender, a "new and innocent man" in
the eye of the law. Ex Parte Casey, 2002 W 254110 (Ala. 2002)
In Arkansas, the same result is obtained as a pardon reaches and absolves both the prior
punishment and the guilt once admitted, making the offender as innocent as if the "crime was never
committed." Duncan v. State, 254 Ark 449, 494 S. W. 2d 127 (1973)
Exactly the same fact pattern as faced by Mr. Winkler was considered by the Supreme Court
of South Carolina in State v. Baucom, 340 S.C. 339, 531 S.E. 2d 922 (2000). Therein, the court
reviewed whether two prior, pardoned DUI offenses could be used to enhance a later offense. That
DUI enhancement statute provided that "Any conviction, entry of a guilty plea ... from operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence . .. shaU constitute a prior offense." South Carolina Code
Annotated Section 56-5-2940 (1991 Suppl. 1999) The law had a ten year sweep back provision
which reached both prior offenses covered by Mr. Baucom ' s pardon. In overturning the lower Court
of Appeals ruling that the words "any conviction" necessarily included pardoned convictions, the
Supreme Court reviewed the language of a pardon definition statute and the Board issued certificate
text which "absolved (Baucom) from all legal consequences of his crime and conviction, and (held)
that all of his civil rights are restored" to preclude the DUI enhancement. Id at 340 S.C. 344.
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Of relevance to Judge Norton's rationale, the South Carolina Court also fairly well addressed
by analogy and dismissed the Black's Law Dictionary idea of"amnesty," by comparing the concepts
of "forgiveness" and "forgetfulness" as follows:
"The Court of Appeals held the italicized phrase "any conviction"
necessarily includes pardoned convictions. The Court of Appeals based
its holding on the theory that a pardon involves forgiveness, but not
forgetfulness. In other words, a pardon forgives the punishment for a crime,
but does not forget or obliterate the act of the commission of the crime.
We disagree. The pardon statute relieves the convict of "all the legal
consequences of his crime and conviction, direct and collateral,
including the punishment, whether of imprisonment, pecuniary penalty or
whatever else the law has provided."
Punishment is only one of the consequences absolved by a pardon in South
Carolina. We believe the better way to approach this question is to ask
whether enhancement of a subsequent sentence is a collateral legal
consequence of the pardoned conviction. The pardon statute states
unambiguously that "an individual is fully pardoned from all the legal
consequences of his crime and of his conviction, direct and collateral."
We conclude sentence enhancement is a forbidden collateral legal consequence
of a pardoned conviction. The words "any conviction" in the repeat offender
statute must be read in light of the plain language of the pardon statute. The
DUI statute was enacted subsequent to the pardon statutes. Thus, the
legislature is charged with knowledge that a pardon relieves the convict of
all the consequences of his conviction. A basic presumption exists that the
legislature has knowledge of previous legislation when later statutes are
passed on a related subject. Moreover, penal statutes are to be strictly
construed against the State and in favor of the defendant. Construing the term
"any conviction" to include a pardoned conviction is inconsistent with
strict construction." Id at 344-345 (citations omitted)(emphasis added)
Although Idaho has no comparable statute defining a pardon, it should hold true also in this
state, that enhancement is "a forbidden collateral legal consequence" which the legislature must
specifically address if it wishes to impair it for a pardoned offender. Idaho Code 18-8005(9) not
having done so, the cleansing effect of a pardon should be respected.
Florida too has preferred the pardon power, viewed from a historical, common law
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perspective, over late-adopted, non-specific, legislative enhancement statutes. Over sixty years ago,
the Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division A, announced a well grounded rule that rings true
today:
"The position taken by the courts in those jurisdictions which adhere more
closely to the rule of the common law in this particular respect would appear
to be in accord with our law and jurisprudence.
"The true rule must be based upon the constitutional intention as to the
effect of pardons and the legislative intention in enacting the Habitual
Criminal Act. In view of the force and effect of a pardon under the common
law, and therefore under the law of thjs state, knowledge and understanding or
whlch must be imputed to the Legislature at the time the statute was enacted,
we must construe their fai lure to expressly include pardoned convictions in
the act as evidencing an intention that they should not be counted."
Keller v. State, supra (204 lnd. 612, 185 N.E. 459) . ..... .
We refer to that portion of the quoted opinion. only to indicate that in
construing a similar statue the court there considered, as we do here, that
inasmuch as the Legislature did not expressly include pardoned convictions
in the Act, it is taken as evidencing an intention on the part of the Legislature
of this State that pardoned convictions not be counted as prior ' live'
felony convictions.
It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that a felony conviction for
which the offender has received a full and unconditional pardon cannot be
counted as a prior felony conviction under the provisions of our habitual
offender laws. The judgment and sentence appealed from are therefore
reversed." Felds v. State, 85 So. 2d 609 (1956) (most citations omitted)

In sum, the historic, rarely exercised pardon power ofthe executive branch should be honored
and accorded the dignity to absolve past guilt and prevent future enhancement, unless a legislature
specifically defines or limits that authority. (See Table of Frequency for Idaho Pardons and
Commutations 2009-2019, attached hereto as Exmbit " A") The Idaho Legislature has not so done
by the text of Idaho Code 18-8005 (9), even though it has the ability to do so under the Idaho
Constitution.
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CONCLUSION
For each and all of the above stated reasons and rationales, the Defendant-Appellant herein,
Brandon Winkler, hereby requests this Honorable Court to reverse the District Court denial of his
Motion to Dismiss and to remand the matter for further consistent proceedings.
Respectfully Submitted:
DATED This ~day ofNovember, 20 19.

for the Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
-1,~,

I hereby certify that on this )~
of the within instrument to:

day of November, 20 J9, I caused a true and correct copy

Idaho Attorney Generals Office
Lawrence G. Wasden
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83 720
email: ecf@ag.idaho.Q.ov
David H. Leroy
Defense Counsel
P.O. Box 193
Boise, Idaho 83702
email: dave@dleroy.com
Scott E. Fouser
Fouser Law Offices
P.O. Box 606
Caldwell, Idaho 83606
sfouser@idaho lawyerfouser .com

Davalee Davis, Executive Assistant
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d: Data Request Pardons & Commutations
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Subject: Fwd: Data Request Pardons & Commutations

:c

From: "Dowell, Ashley" <adowell@idoc.idaho.gov>

Date: 11/25/2019, 2:17 PM
To: " dave@dleroy.com" <dave@dleroy.com>

><

I.I.I

Hi Mr. Leroy,
It appears our former research analyst was able to complete this today. Please see below and let me know if you have any additional questions.
Best,
Ashley
Ashley Dowell
Executive Director
Idaho Commission of Pardon s and Parole
3056 Elder Street
Boise, Idaho 8 3705
208-334-2520

Commutation Petition
Commutation Hearing
Grant Commutation
Pardon Request
Pardon Hearing
Grant Pardon

I
I

I
I

2009
177
0
0%
0
0%
19
5
26%
4
80%

2010
187
0
0%
0
0%
41
12
29%
9
75%

2011
154
0
0%
0
0%
37
14
38%
14
100%

2012
201
2
0%
1
50%
28
13
46%
13

100%

2013
192
1
0%
1
100%
31
26
84%
21
81%

2014
208
0
0%
0
0%
38
15
39%
15
100%

2015
208
1
0%
1
100%
65
21
32%
21
100%

2016
25 7
2
1%
0
0%
70
30
43%
28
9 3%

2017
141
0
0%
0
0%
47
47
100%
36
77%

2018
19 2
3
2%
1
33%
50
20
4 0%
17
85%

2019YTD
147
1
1%
0

0%
37
27
73%
25
93%

